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FISCHER AND AVOIDABILITY:
A REPLY TO WIDERKER AND KATZ OFF
Daniel James Speak

In a recent exchange, John M. Fischer and David Widerker have debated
whether or not it is appropriate to employ Frankfurt-style examples in efforts
to challenge the intuitively plausible "principle of alternative possibilities."
Most recently, David Widerker and Charlotte Katzoff have tried to defend
Widerker's initial claim that such examples beg the question against libertarianism. As a libertarian sympathizer, I would like very much for these arguments to go through. However, I argue here that (1) their "molinist" critique is
off-target, (2) their demonstration of the general falsity of Fischer's libertarianism misses the point, and (3) they infer the relevance of alternative possibilities
from the mere existence of such alternatives in a way that requires unprovided
justification.

The pages of this journal have recently been the setting for what I take to
be an important debate for those concerned with the relationship
between freedom and moral responsibility. At issue in this debate,
broadly, has been the appropriateness of employing Frankfurt-style
counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP)l. In
these examples, an agent is choosing between two alternative courses of
action, A and B. However, the agent is unaware of the presence of an
intervener with the ability and desire to guarantee that she (the agent)
choose A. So, if the intervener recognizes an inclination in the agent to
choose B, he uses his power to bring it about that she chooses A. Thus, it
seems that the agent cannot avoid choosing A. Nevertheless, it looks as if
the agent can be held morally responsible for choosing A, provided she
does so without intervention. In other words, she can be responsible for
choosing A even though she could not do otherwise. David Widerker
has argued that the structure of such examples presupposes the falsity of
libertarianism. 2 That is, he suggests that the examples "work" only if
some form of causal determinism obtains in the sequence.' If this is
right, it is an important critique, since Frankfurt-style examples are supposed to be cases in which an individual intuitively is morally responsible. Compatiblistic arguments which employ such examples would,
then, be unacceptably question-begging.
In response, John Martin Fischer has tried to show that the conditions
for Frankfurt-style examples do not necessarily violate the intuitions of
libertarians. 4 For, he argues, there are plausible versions of libertarianism
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that can account for the in-principle predictable relationship in an agent
between prior signs and subsequent actions required by the examples.
More specifically, Fischer has pointed out that: (1) employing Widerker's
reasoning involves rejecting without argument the view (associated with
Molina, among others) that subjunctive conditionals pertaining to free
actions could be rendered true by non-causal facts, and (2) forms of libertarianism can be constructed that side-step Widerker's attack. In particular, Fischer presents a version of libertarianism in which there is indeterminacy in the agent's deliberations, but not in the transition from the
agent's best judgment to action. This plausible version of libertarianism,
he claims, is compatible with Frankfurt-style counterexamples.
In the latest salvo, David Widerker and Charlotte Katzoff defend the
original claim that the counterfactual intervention required by Frankfurtstyle examples assumes conditions that the libertarian finds problematic.'
They argue, first, that Fischer's suggestion about the relevant subjunctive
conditionals undermines the coherence of Molinism. Also, they insist
that the version of libertarianism Fischer develops is demonstrably false.
Finally, they suggest that even if Fischer's libertarianism is granted, alternative possibilities are still necessary for moral responsibility.
This is obviously a rough sketch of their arguments and fuller development will be necessary shortly. However, I should say at this point
that my own intuitions are incompatiblistic. This would, of course,
make Widerker and Katzoff natural allies. Nevertheless, I feel compelled to respond to them (grudgingly) on Fischer's behalf. The contentions of Widerker and Katzoff in "Avoidability and Libertarianism"
seem to me to be largely on the wrong track. I begin by arguing that
their first two responses leave Fischer's thesis untouched. That is, I try
to show that nothing in Fischer's argument hangs either on the coherence of Molinism or the universal applicability of the form of libertarianism he sketches as an example. But their third point -regarding the
presence of alternatives even in this libertarian case- has promise.
However, their account of the possible alternatives is confusing and
ambiguous. After attempting to remove this confusion by suggesting
various interpretations of their account, I argue that their conclusion
comes too quickly. For it does not follow (directly) from the fact that
there are alternatives in these cases that such alternatives constitute a
necessary condition for moral responsibility. In fact, it is precisely this
inference that Fischer explicitly attempts to discredit in Chapter seven of
The Metaphysics olFree Will. There he contends that the mere presence of
alternatives (even in Frankfurt cases) only reveals that there is a "flicker
of freedom." He goes on to defend the claim that such flickers are not
robust enough to ground our attributions of moral responsibility.6
While Widerker and Katzoff are aware of this "anti-flicker" strategy,
they fail to take it seriously enough.
I. The "Molinist" Problem

Widerker and Katzoff begin their response by claiming that Fischer's
account of (what they call) "Molinist necessity" renders Molinism inco-
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herent. That is, if Molina's view about the power of non-causal facts
were as Fischer describes, then it would be incompatible with other features of Molina's general theory. As I suggested above, this response
seems off-target.
Fischer's concern is with a particular libertarian view about agency -{)ne
compatible with Frankfurt-style examples. On this view, an agent's actions
can be accurately predicted if the predictor has access to crucial facts about
the agent (say, facts about her character, values, etc.). Still, a libertarian of
this sort will stop short of saying that the agent's action, though predictable,
is causally determined.
This is to say that, according to Fischer, conditionals like the following could be true:
(5) If Jones were to show an inclination at T to decide to vote for
Reagan at T+i, then Jones would decide to vote for Reagan at T +i.
Furthermore, the truth of such conditionals need not be determined by
causal facts. Thus, it could also be true that
(5b) If Jones were to show an inclination at T to decide to vote for
Reagan at T+i, then Jones would freely decide to vote for Reagan at T+i.
Fischer contends that it is possible for subjunctive conditionals of freedom
like those above to be true. Widerker and Katzoff have merely assumed
the falsity of this contention in their analysis of Frankfurt-style examples.
Admittedly, Fischer attributes this view about subjunctive conditionals of freedom to Molina. And perhaps he could have been a bit more
cautious by resisting the urge to term this view "Molinism." However,
Fischer is explicit about his intentions at this point. He says, '''Molinism'
is just a convenient term for the specific view under consideration
here."7 That is, Fischer uses "Molinism" simply to refer to the claim that
there can be true subjunctive conditionals of freedom. According to
Fischer, Widerker's claim that libertarianism is incompatible with
Frankfurt examples assumes that a form of libertarianism in which noncausal facts can produce a kind of necessity is false.
Now I hope it is clear why the response of Widerker and Katzoff misses the point. Their claim is that Fischer's interpretation of Molina makes
Molinism (broadly construed) inconsistent. But this counter threatens
the argument only if Fischer is seeking to offer an interpretation of part of
Molina's views which could then be imbedded within an account of
Molina's views as a whole. But this is not Fischer's intention. According
to Fischer, Widerker's claim that libertarianism is incompatible with
Frankfurt examples assumes that a form of libertarianism in which noncausal facts can produce a kind of necessity is false. And this should not
be merely assumed.
II. The response to Dennett's libertarianism
In" A Reply To Widerker" Fischer formulates another version of libertari-
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anism that he believes is compatible with Frankfurt-style examples.
Following suggestions by Daniel Dennett, he proposes an account of action
in which there is indeterminacy in the process leading to an agent's best
judgment. However, there is causal determination from the agent's best
judgment to the agent's action. In this sort of case, it is clear that one could
construct a Frankfurt-style example. For the agent could manifest a sign of
his best judgment that a potential intervener could read and respond to.
To explain, we could suppose for example, that whatever processes of
deliberation Jones employs in contemplating whom to vote for are not
deterministic. That is, at no point during his deliberation could the outcome of his voting be inerrantly predicted. Thus, Jones appears to be
free in a relevant libertarian sense. However, we could also suppose
that once Jones forms the best judgment -that (say) he ought to vote for
Reagan- then it is inevitable that he vote for Reagan. Further, we can
imagine that if Jones forms the best judgment that he ought to vote for
Reagan, he also presents a certain sign of this judgment. Let us assume
that he exhibits a distinctive neural pattern. In this case, an intervener
(properly constituted) could recognize this pattern and respond accordingly. This seems to be a case in which Frankfurt-style examples are
compatible with libertarianism.
Widerker and Katzoff, however, believe that this account of action is
demonstrably false. For, they argue, if the above sort of libertarianism
were an accurate description of action, then weakness of the will would
be impossible. This is because weakness of the will is defined here as
the failure of an agent to act on his best judgment. There can be no such
failure if causal determinism obtains between best judgment and action.
At this point, Widerker and Katzoff simply point out, by example, that
people sometimes do act against their best judgment. An individual
may very well know that he ought to go to the dentist rather than put it
off. Nevertheless, he does not make the appointment. Thus, the
Dennett/Fischer suggestion on behalf of the libertarian must be false.
Now, this response would be appropriate if the universal scope of
this version of libertarianism were necessary to establish Fischer's view.
But this is not the case. Again, Fischer is intending to show that an
action can be free in a libertarian sense and yet still be predictable in a
way required by the Frankfurt examples. Thus, Fischer can admit that
human action often displays akrasia without giving up his point. He
does not need Dennett's libertarianism to be true in every case. He needs
only one case in which there is indeterminacy in the agent's deliberation
and yet there is determination from best judgment to action. If there is
(or could be) just one such case, then a Frankfurt-style example can be
constructed that will show that the agent in this case can be responsible
for an action even though she could not have avoided it. And presumably a libertarian will admit that at least some cases are (or could be) like
this. That is, there is (or could be) at least one person who is so constituted that she cannot fail (in a particular circumstance) to act on her best
judgment. This, it seems to me, is Fischer's point. If this is right, then
the response of Widerker and Katzoff misses the mark again. For it
makes no difference whether or not this version of libertarianism is uni-
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versally accurate.
But perhaps Widerker and Katzoff are suggesting that the reality of
incontinence, which they illustrate in a particular case, tells us something about human motivational structure in general. Perhaps they are
arguing that weakness of the will is always possible for an agent in
every circumstance. b If this were true, then I grant that Fischer's libertarianism would be discredited.
I do not believe, however, that Widerker and Katzoff have the argumentative machinery in place necessary to reach this conclusion. 9 Such
machinery would have to justify the inference from the existence of
incontinence on some occasions to the universal possibility of incontinence for all human agents in every circumstance. How could this inference possibly be justified? Given the example they have constructed,
and the accompanying argumentation, Widerker and Katzoff seem justified only in asserting that some actions of some agents are not ensured
by (and thus are not "deterministically related to") the agent's best judgment. To make the argument that seems to me necessary to invalidate
Fischer's claim, they need to defend something like: (*) If the actions of
some agents are not ensured by their best judgments, then the actions of
no agents are ensured by their best judgment. This would be an intriguing claim, but I do not see any straightforward way of establishing it.
Since Widerker and Katzoff have given us no reason to accept (*), I conclude that Fischer's thesis remains viable.
Fischer merely presents a hypothetical possibility. He is not seeking
to give an account of how all or most people actually are. Similarly,
Harry Frankfurt was not assuming that his original examples captured
some essential or common feature of human action. We can safely presume that situations in which there is a looming intervener are statistically rare. The paint is the possibility. And the same is true with
Fischer's example. At issue is whether or not this particular libertarian
description of action can apply to at least one case. Widerker and
Katzoff seem to have provided no reason for doubting this.
III. Ubiquitous Alternatives

In their final argument, Widerker and Katzoff grant the plausibility of
Fischer's hybrid libertarianism (merely for the sake of argument). Then
they attempt to show that even if this form of libertarianism is right,
there will still be room in Frankfurt examples for some alternative possibilities. In particular, they claim that we would hold an agent accountable under these circumstances (at least in part) because the agent could
have formed an alternative best judgment. As they point out, Fischer
rejects this idea, and proposes this example:
... a baby has fallen into a swimming pool in front of you and is in
immediate danger of drowning. All you have to do is bend over
and pick the baby up; this would be extremely easy for you, and
we may suppose that there are no other morally relevant reasons.lO
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Suppose, now, that this is a Frankfurt case in which the intervener
intends for you to save the baby. Thus, it is impossible for you to do
otherwise than save the baby (since the intervener is able to read a sign
of your best judgment and respond accordingly). Further, let us suppose that you save the baby without intervention. Clearly you are
responsible for your act. Now, Fischer admits that you could have
formed an alternative best judgment. But he claims (a la Susan Wolf)
that it is simply implausible to think that it is the existence of this very
peculiar alternative that grounds your responsibility for the action. Why
think that it is because you could have judged it best not to save the baby
(when you had every reason to do so) that you are responsible, in the
actual sequence, for saving the baby? Why think, as it were, that being
able to judge irrationally should be relevant to such ascriptions?
In response, Widerker and Katzoff wonder n .•. whether the sort of possibility Fischer imagines is coherent, whether a normal person could
judge best something for which he sees no good reason."ll But this
seems to be tantamount to granting Fischer his point. If this option is
incoherent for a normal person, then it looks to be a case in which a normal person has no alternatives and yet is morally responsible.
However, they suggest, in an apparent counter to the above reasoning,
that we suppose n ..• the alternative possibility in question is that of forming simply a different judgment" (their italics).'" This is confusing. It is
unclear what the relationship is between a judgment and a best judgment, and why an alternative best judgment might be incoherent but an
alternative judgment is not. What sense can be made of the distinction
between a different best judgment and merely a different judgment?
Perhaps they are appealing to a type-token distinction. Perhaps, that
is, they are imagining that it is incoherent for a normal person to form a
different type of judgment in this circumstance, but such a person could
nevertheless form a different token judgment. When you formed the best
judgment at t1 to save the child at t3, for example, you could also have
formed the best judgment at t2 to save the child at t3. Another possibility here is that, while you formed the token judgment that you should
save the baby by pulling her out of the pool by her feet, you could have
avoided this token judgment by forming the alternative token judgment
that you should pull her out by her arms.
The danger with this response is that it does not seem to avoid or
address Fischer's initial challenge. Fischer's argument was that even if
you could form an alternative best judgment in the drowning-baby case,
the alternatives available to a normal person would be too thin to
ground moral responsibility. If the alternatives that Widerker and
Katzoff ultimately appeal to are mere token differences, then Fischer's
argument (plausibly) goes through. Why think that it is because you
had mere temporal or stylistic options of this limited sort that you are
responsible for your action?13 This sort of alternative possibility would
not seem to be sufficiently robust to ground responsibility ascriptions.
There is a second way in which Widerker and Katzoff might attempt
to make sense of their crucial distinction between different best judgments and different judgments. They might claim that a best judgment
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is an all-things-considered judgment, but there can be other judgments
which are not all-things-considered. On this account, you could not
have reached a different all-things-considered judgment, but not all
actions result from such judgments. Many of our judgments are premature or not fully informed. Sometimes such judgments lead to action.
And you could have acted, in the drowning-baby case, on a less-thanall-things-considered judgment.
This analysis still appears to fall prey to Fischer's plausibility argument against the relevance of these sorts of alternabves. Admittedly,
Widerker and Katzoff can, on this reading, maintain their position that a
best judgment not to save the baby is incoherent. However, they will
have to grant that a normal person could come to a different judgment
only by (say) ignoring relevant data or failing to pay attention to the
details of the situation. Furthermore, they will be forced to insist that it
is in virtue of such alternatives that you are responsible for saving the
baby. You are responsible because you could have acted in an irrational
(indeed, one might say "irresponsible") fashion. Fischer argues that this
is odd, and it does seem paradoxical that moral responsibility should rest
on the possibility of irrationality.14
Finally, Widerker and Katzoff might be appealing to a distinction
very different from the sort considered aboveY Notice that the two
potential interpretations I have explored involve differences in (what I
will call) the structure of the alternative judgments. Thus, on these interpretations the difference between a best judgment and a merely different
judgment is not a matter of content. Both judgments are still about what
is best to do. But it might be that Widereker and Katzoff are appealing to
a difference in the content of the alternative judgment. A best judgment
is about what is best to do. A different judgment might be about what is
expedient, convenient, cruel, or fun to do.
In response, recall Fischer's flicker argument. We want to know if the
alternatives available to you in the drowning baby case can reasonably
be thought to provide a foundation for our ascription to you of responsibility for saving the baby. Is it because you could have formed a judgment with different content (as here defined) that you are responsible
for your action? I contend that Fischer's negative answer to this question remains plausible and defensible.
Why? Because Fischer's would-be interlocutor seems to be on the
horns of a dilemma. Your alternative judgment either can lead to acbon
or it cannot. If it cannot, then it is not relevant to ascriptions of responsibility. Who cares if you can form the judgment that it would be (say)
more convenient not to save the baby if your judgment cannot issue in
action? Intuitively, only alternative judgments that can lead to alternative actions can bear on the question of responsibility for a given action.
On the other hand, if the judgment in question can lead to action, then
the problem of irrationality reappears. No normal person can fail to
save the baby. The example is constructed so that any such failure will
be irrational. And failing to save the baby will be irrational regardless of
the content of the judgment that leads to this action. In defense of
Fischer, I simply re-emphasize his initial Wolfian claim that it is implau-
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sible to think that our attributions of responsibility rest on the possibility
of this sort of irrationality. Thus, this interpretation of the notion of a
merely different judgment in terms of difference in content is no more
satisfying than the interpretations in terms of difference in structure.
In general, Widerker and Katzoff seem to assume what is false: that
the inference from the existence of alternatives to the relevance of alternatives requires no argument.'" I think incompatiblists, such as Widerker
and Katzoff, need to respond to Fischer's argument that the sort of alternatives Widerker and Katzoff have isolated are not relevant. It is not
enough to find a flicker of freedom, as Widerker and Katzoff have done.
It must also be shown that these flickers have the kind of robustness sufficient to ground responsibility. Those of us who are tempted by incompatiblism must go on, as it were, to "fan" the flickers of freedom. 1?

University of California, Riverside
NOTES
1. See Harry Frankfurt's two seminal papers: "Alternate Possibilities
and Moral Responsibility." Journal of Philosophy, 45 (1969), 829-839 and
"Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Journal of Philosophy, 68
(1971), 5-20. Frankfurt's work has spawned an enormous literature. Some
particularly salient discussions include Peter van Inwagen's An Essay On
Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), and Chapter 7 of John
Martin Fischer's The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge: Blackwell
Publishers Inc., 1994).
2. David Widerker, "Libertarianism and the Avoidability of Decisions,"
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Significance Of Free Will (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996). See pp.
142-3. The leading idea here is that the force of the counterexamples
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action at t3 from some earlier point in time tl. But such accuracy can only
be guaranteed if the agent is determined at t1 to act in a certain way at t3.
Since whether or not this sort of determination exists is an essential question
in the debate, the compatiblist can employ Frankfurt-style examples only by
breaching dialectical propriety. Some replies to the Widerker/Kane style of
argument are: Eleonore Stump's "Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of
Alternative Possibilities," in Faith, Freedom and Rationality, ed. Daniel
Howard-Snyder and Jeff Jordan (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 73-88 and
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14. See Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
15. Widerker and Katzoff seem to make another closely related assumption. They assume that all plausible accounts of moral responsibility include
avoidability as a necessary condition. Thus they conclude their article with
the following assessment of the drowning-baby case: " ... the judgment's
being avoidable is the only alternative which remains for viewing the agent
as morally responsible, even fron the point of view of Fischer's libertarian."
This assumption is also false. Fischer and Ravizza, for example, have
recently formulated a description of moral responsibility that seems to capture our ordinary intuitions, but that does not make being able to do otherwise a necessary condition. In the drowning-baby case, then, they will
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